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This dissertation investigates how the Muldergate scandal affected South Africa’s international 
image. In his book Selling Apartheid, Ron Nixon claimed that the Muldergate scandal had a 
negligible effect, stating that it was “just a bump in the road.” Nixon then concluded his chapter 
on Muldergate without further explanation or justification. I have investigated how the 
Muldergate Scandal was portrayed by foreign media, and sought to gauge the foreign public 
response to it. I did this by examining articles from three London newspapers between the 1960s  
and 1980s . I will show that the events of the Muldergate Scandal were made public through these 
newspapers, and despite the copious information available, the scandal did not have a significant 
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BOSS – Bureau of State Security 
ANC – African National Congress 
OCR – Optical Character Recognition 




Verligte: Literally translated as ‘enlightened ones.’ A group of comparatively more liberal and left-
leaning members of the National Party. 
 
Verkrampte: Literally translated as ‘cramped ones.’ Members of the National Party who took a 
hardline approach devoted to the idea of white supremacy.2 
 
Apartheid: The political system of segregation instituted in South Africa from 1948-1991.  
       It had two colloquialised sub-categories, Petty and Grand Apartheid.  
 
Petty Apartheid: Apartheid in practice at an everyday level. Examples include: segregated toilets, 
benches, and doors.   
 
Grand Apartheid: Apartheid in practice at a national level, usually applied through legal polices. 
Example: The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, passed in 1949.   
 
Bantustan: A rural area of self-government for black South Africans to live in, as designated by the 
Apartheid Government. Bantustans tended to be puppet states located on unwanted rural lands 







                                                                 
1 For continuation of flow and ease of reading, all  non-English words will be written without italics.  
2 For further reading on the nature of the verligte and verkrampte divide, see Sanford Ungar, Africa: The People and 




Part One: Unraveling the Enigma. 
 
 “What is remarkable is that the scandal did little to hurt the international image of South Africa. 
Through the scandal, the world had been given a glimpse of the lengths to which the country 
would go to protect itself, and it gave further political ammunition to the still-growing anti-
Apartheid movement. All the same, the Apartheid Government managed to end the 1970s by 
holding off economic sanctions and other punitive actions against it. Muldergate was just a bump 
in the road. The Apartheid propaganda machine continued to roll on.” [emphasis added] 3 
- Ron Nixon, 2015.  
 
In 1978, South Africa’s Apartheid Government faced its worst political scandal since the beginning 
of Apartheid.4 The Information Scandal, dubbed ‘Muldergate’ after the Minister of Information 
Cornelius ‘Connie’ Mulder, revealed the existence of South Africa’s secret propaganda war, waged 
to sell Apartheid’s racist ideologies to the West. It was managed by the Department of 
Information and headed up by Eschel Rhoodie, the Secretary of Information. Muldergate exposed 
the widespread corruption, bribery, extortion, self-enrichment, and misappropriation of 
government funds that was rife within the National Party.5 It shook the very foundations of white 
South Africa, and radically reshaped the already divided National Party. Muldergate tarnished the 
righteous image these hyper-Calvinist leaders spent years portraying to their devout supporters.6 
Muldergate resulted in Prime Minister Vorster’s ignominious retirement, the ‘early retirement’ of 
Secretary of Information Eschel Rhoodie, the fall from grace of Connie Mulder, and the public 
revelation of the manipulative disposition of General Hendrik van den Bergh, the former head of 
                                                                 
3 Ron Nixon, Selling Apartheid: South Africa's Global Propaganda War (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2015), 100. 
4 For the purposes of the essay I will  capitalise ‘Apartheid,’ for I refer to it as the system of institutionalised racism by 
the South African Government. For a good definition of the characteristics and nature of Apartheid, see Merle Lipton, 
“Reform: Destruction or Modernization of Apartheid,” in South Africa in Crisis, ed. Jesmond Blumenfeld (London & 
New York: Croon Helm, 1987), 34-56. 
5 For consistency and simplicity of language, all  references to the events of the ‘The Information Scandal’ or the 
‘Muldergate scandal ,’ will simply be called Muldergate, with no italics or inverted commas to assist overall reading. 
6 For more on the effects of Muldergate see: All ister Sparks, foreword to Muldergate: The Story of the Information 
Scandal, by Mervyn Rees and Chris Day (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1980) XIV; Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The 
Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994 (Ohio: Ohio University, 1996), 230; Richard Bissell, 
South Africa and the United States: The Erosion of an Influence Relationship  (New York: Praeger, 1982). 
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BOSS. Before Muldergate, Mulder was one of the leading candidates to succeed Vorster as Prime 
Minister. Many scholars and commentators have acknowledged that Muldergate was the deciding 
factor that culminated in Mulder’s loss in the upcoming election to fellow National Party 
candidate, Pieter Willem (P.W.) Botha.7 In Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of 
the National Party, 1948-1994, Dan O’Meara claimed it was P.W. Botha’s ascension to Prime 
Minister that “accelerated both the process of reform and the final sundering of the National 
Party.”8 This  shows that O’Meara viewed Muldergate as foundational for the demise of Apartheid. 
Cons idering O’Meara’s claim, how could Nixon state that Muldergate was “just a bump in the 
road,” hardly affecting Apartheid’s “international image?”9 What is even more confounding is that 
Nixon does not substantiate his claim with evidence. 
 
This dissertation examines Muldergate’s portrayal within London’s media. The events of 
Muldergate were covered by the three newspapers I selected. This small sample of English 
newspapers suggest that the events of Muldergate were more than sufficiently covered by the 
English general media. I dedicate the greater parts of chapter one and two to proving this. Chapter 
three provides reasons for the West’s underwhelming reaction to Muldergate. This reaction 
allowed the scandal to become “just a bump in the road.” All chapters are structured thematically, 
rather than chronologically, to reduce unnecessary repetition. This dissertation challenges the 
current historiographic trends in studies of both Muldergate and Apartheid. There has been a 
                                                                 
7 For ease of understanding, I will  always refer to Prime Minister Pieter Willem Botha as P.W. Botha, as to clearly 
distinguish him from R.F. ‘Pik’ Botha, who was also a member of the National Party and candidate in the 1978 
election. 
8 O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, 230.  
9 Nixon, Selling Apartheid, 100. 
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decrease in scholarly interest in Muldergate since the 1980s . A large volume of books were written 
about both Muldergate and Apartheid in the 1980s, as it was recent news, appealing to political 
and social scientists alike. By the late 1990s , scholarly interest in Muldergate had faded, and this 
trend continued into the 2000s. A very s imple search for ‘Muldergate’ within the University of 
Canterbury’s library database across three decades, 1980s , 1990s, and 2000s , showed the quantity 
of works  written on the topic has decreased. The results revealed 99, 64, and 35 works 
respectively. Although this is a crude measurement device, it is indicative of the trend of 
decreasing scholarly interest in Muldergate. This logic follows if one considers that Muldergate is 
in a state of limbo, too old to be of interest to social scientists, and too recent to appeal to 
historians. This means that my research has focused on works published in the 1980s  as well as 
news media, as much of Muldergate’s source material was produced by journalists. There have 
been numerous works, such as Nixon’s, that examined Apartheid propaganda in the media, and 
even works that have examined the relationship between Apartheid and the media. However, 
there has been little primary research done testing Nixon’s “bump in the road” claim through 
foreign opinion as displayed in London’s media. By researching in London newspapers, I sought to 
uncover how Apartheid has been viewed by overseas nations, and to show that Muldergate did 
precious little to hurt South Africa’s international image.  
 
The Apartheid Government placed great importance on how the British media portrayed them. In 
The Press and Apartheid: Repression and Propaganda in South Africa, William Hachten and 
Anthony Giffard noted that in 1959, “the South African Information Department prepared an 
analysis of British newspapers, which purported to show that three -quarters of their items about 
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South Africa were concerned with ‘negative subjects’ which created ‘an unfortunate impression in 
the British reader.’”10 This shows that before the events of Muldergate, the Apartheid 
Government valued how they were portrayed by the British media. In South Africa and the 
International Media, 1972-1979: A Struggle for Representation, James Sanders, who has written 
on media responses to Apartheid, argued the importance of studying British media when he 
s tated, “[a]lthough the central thrust of the Department of Information’s program of manipulation 
was aimed at the U.S. media, Britain remained ‘in terms of psychology, if not so much in real 
terms , of the greatest importance to South Africa’.”11 This reinforces the idea that the Apartheid 
Government was greatly concerned by their portrayal in the British media. After all, it was the 
negative press about Apartheid that led the Department of Information to initiate their 
propaganda war. The newspapers I examined are all London dailies, being the Times, the 
Telegraph, and the Daily Mail. In Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain, Jeremy 
Tunstall claimed that London’s newspapers were influential throughout England, stating, “[t]he 
British press is an extreme case within Europe, in the extent to which it is dominated by national 
newspapers published in one city. The leading publications are all London daily newspapers.”12 
London’s dailies have a wider range of influence than just one city.  
 
These newspapers’ past issues are fully accessible online through Gale Newsvault. The University 
of Canterbury database provided access to the Times digital archive, whereas access to the Daily 
                                                                 
10 Will iam Hachten and Anthony Giffard, The Press and Apartheid: Repression and Propaganda in South Africa  
(Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin, 1984), 231. 
11 James Sanders, South Africa and the International Media 1972-1979: A Struggle for Representation (London: Frank 
Cass, 2000), 210.  
12Jeremy Tunstall, Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 2.  
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Mail and the Telegraph was through Christchurch City Libraries. Along with newspapers, there 
were other sources of information about Muldergate made available to the public. The South 
African reporter Mervyn Rees from the Rand Daily Mail released a full-length book in 1980 
detailing the two years he spent researching Muldergate.13 Along with Rees’s investigative 
journalism, those implicated in Muldergate testified to the media. The most vocal of these was 
Rhoodie, who even published books sharing his perspective of the Muldergate scandal.14 The 
existence of these books all reinforce my claim that the information regarding Muldergate was 
widely available to the public.  
 
Us ing digital archives instead of physical copies provides both advantages and challenges for the 
contemporary historian. In ‘The Digitization of Newspaper Archives,’ Adrian Bingham claimed that 
“digital searching enables newspaper content to be explored far more rigorously and sensitively” 
than previously.15 He also stated that “historians can be far more confident that content will not 
elude them, and that they will track down obscure and potentially revealing articles.”16 By using 
digital archives, historians have the potential to examine sources more accurately a nd thoroughly 
than when they only had access to hard copies. Along with the benefits of digitisation, there are 
also challenges to negotiate. Bingham noted the dualistic nature of using search engines when he 
s tated, “keyword searching can be very effective if used properly, but it is also in some ways a 
rather blunt instrument. The absence of a particular word does not necessarily mean that a 
                                                                 
13 Rees and Day, Muldergate, The Story of the Information Scandal.   
14 See, Eschel Rhoodie, PW Botha: The Last Betrayal (Melvil le: S.A Politics, 1989).  
15 Adrian Bingham, "The Digitization of Newspaper Archives: Opportunities and Challenges for Historians," 20th Century 
British History 21 (2010): 228, accessed July 19, 2017. doi:10.1093/tcbh/hwq007. 
16 Bingham, “The Digitization,” 228.  
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subject is not discussed, it may merely indicate that alternative terminology has b een used.”17 By 
uti l ising a variety of keyword searches, I sought to avoid accidentally bypassing important articles 
within each database. I used a mix of single word searches for specific terms relevant to my s tudy, 
as  well as partial phrases to provide a more general search. It was soon apparent that there were 
numerous articles on Apartheid, South Africa, and Muldergate. For example, a simple search for 
‘Muldergate’ in the Times historical archive revealed 19 articles, and a search for ‘Rhoodie’ 
revealed 28 articles. However, a more general search for ‘South Africa’ within 1978 revealed 1,655 
articles. This created a new challenge for digital research. The sheer volume of information 
available means that it now takes more work to review and examine these sources. Another 
concern when using digital sources is the efficiency of the OCR software applied. If the software 
was unable to recognise characters or punctuation, then works could have be missed. In 'Open 
Source Optical Character Recognition for Historical Research,' Tobias Blanke, Michael Bryant, and 
Mark Hedges discuss OCR and its ability to digitise historical documents. They noted that although 
OCR software had previously s truggled to recognise handwriting, this has changed with the 
invention of tablet computers. They also noted that OCR tended to struggle to recognise aged 
historical documents.18 The printed newspapers that I have been examining would have provided 
l ittle difficulty for OCR software to digitize, therefor reducing the likelihood of technical errors 
outs ide of my control. 
 
                                                                 
17 Bingham, “The Digitization,” 230.  
18 Tobias Blanke., Michael Bryant and Mark Hedges, “Open Source Optical Character Recognition for Historical 
Research,” Journal of Documentation 68 (2012): 661, accessed October 10, 2017, doi:10.1108/00220411211256021. 
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Along with acknowledging the challenges and benefits of using digital archives, it was 
important to understand the popularity of the newspapers I was researching. Circulation statistics 
provided some insight into each newspapers’ level of influence. In Pulling Newspapers Apart: 
Analyzing Print Journalism, Bob Franklin differentiates between the ‘mid-market’ and the ‘quality’ 
newspapers.19 Image one, below, shows that the Times and the Telegraph had the highest 
readership among the ‘quality’ newspapers in 1985, the date closest to Muldergate. Although the 
Sun had the highest circulation numbers, it was a tabloid rather than a broadsheet, and not seen 
as  a ‘quality’ newspaper.20 Kevin Williams, in Read All About It: A History of the British Newspaper, 
defined the Times as “part of the establishment” and a “reputable newspaper.”21 Along with the 
Times, the Telegraph was the market leader of the quality papers, taking two thirds of their 
sales.22 I have incorporated the Daily Mail in my thesis as an example of a ‘mid-market’ paper, 
although I have not referenced it as frequently as the Times and the Telegraph. This is because it 
had fewer articles on Muldergate than the ‘quality’ papers. In ‘But if It's in the Newspaper, Doesn't 
That Mean It’s True?’ Sally Hoskins noted that “[r]eporters often reinterpret and summarise 
information from primary sources (journal articles) or s implify findings from long-term scientific 
studies. The writing may reflect the reporters’ gaps in understanding, changes in the editing 
process, or even subtle biases.”23 I have sought to address the “gaps” or “biases” within 
                                                                 
19 Bob Franklin, ed., Pulling Newspapers Apart: Analysing Print Journalism, (London: Taylor and Francis, 2008), 7, 
accessed July 19, 2017. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com. 
20 Franklin, Pulling Newspapers Apart, 7.  
21 Kevin Will iams, Read All About It: A History of the British Newspaper (London: Taylor and Francis, 2008), 205, 
accessed July 19, 2017. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com. 
22 Will iams, Read All About It, 205.  
23 Sally Hoskins, “’But If It's in the Newspaper, Doesn't That Mean It's True?’ Developing Critical Reading & Analysis 
Skills by Evaluating Newspaper Science with Create," The American Biology Teacher 72 (2010): 415, accessed 
September 21, 2017. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz. 
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newspapers by examining large quantities of articles, seeking out general trends, and examining 
the information within individual articles. It is also worth noting whether the source material was 
an article written by a journalist, which represented the opinion of the newspaper as whole, or 
was a letter written to the newspaper as an opinion piece by a third party. I have sought to ignore 
opinion pieces wherever possible, unless they provided useful insights. There was a trend within 
newspapers for many of the articles about Apartheid to have been written by the same one or two 
journalists. This means that reading about Apartheid within one newspaper means you are 
reading a narrow scope of work. Although there is little that can be done to address this, I have 
sought to eliminate some of the human error by comparing the information revealed in the 
newspapers with the information provided by a wide range of secondary sources. Hopefully, this 
reduced the likelihood of posting a quote or example from a newspaper that does not line up with 
commonly accepted historiographic facts. My research sought to show that the events of 
Muldergate were made common knowledge to the public through articles written by journalists 














Along with gaining an understanding of the circulation numbers of newspapers, it was important 
to examine the political partisanship, or bias, of each newspaper. As  Apartheid was predominantly 
a race-based issue led by an extremely conservative right-wing government, it follows that the 
more l iberal a newspaper was, the more opposed towards Apartheid it would  have been. 
Logically, one would expect that their articles would reflect this. Likewise, one would assume that 
the more conservative a newspaper was, the more likely it would have been to write articles 
                                                                 
24 Franklin, Pulling Newspapers Apart, 8. 
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sympathetic towards Apartheid, potentially downplaying the events of Muldergate. This made the 
information revealed in the Times, the Telegraph, and the Daily Mail more surprising. All are 
cons idered to have a conservative leaning, being either right or center-right. Williams stated that 
the Telegraph was “strongly conservative” in nature, but also tended to be independent.25 In The 
British Press, Mick Temple stated that two-thirds of the Telegraph readers planned to vote 
Conservative in 2005.”26 Ivor Gaber’s 2014 article, ‘The ‘Othering’ of ‘Red Ed’, or How the Daily 
Mail ‘Framed’ the British Labour Leader,’ showed that the Daily Mail was conservative as it sought 
to label the liberal politician Ed Miliband as a communist. 27 The Daily Mail took a similarly 
conservative stance during Muldergate. Despite their conservative stance, these newspapers 
revealed the events of Muldergate to the public. The fact that conservative newspapers wrote 
negative articles regarding Muldergate and Apartheid reinforces the overall negative perception 
Muldergate would have received from a mix of both liberal and conservative newspapers. By 
combining an examination of the political leanings and circulation numbers of ‘quality’ and ‘mid-
market’ newspapers, I have gained an understanding of the overall perception of Muldergate 
portrayed by London’s newspapers. The following two chapters will show that the events of 







                                                                 
25 Will iams, Read All About It, 206.    
26 Mick Temple, The British Press (Berkshire: McGraw-Hill  Education, 2008), 191, accessed July 19, 2017. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.  
27 Ivor Gaber, "The ‘Othering’ of ‘Red Ed’, or How the Daily Mail ‘Framed’ The British Labour Leader," The Political 
Quarterly 85 (2014): 471-479, accessed September 21, 2017. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12114. 
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Part Two: The Process. 
 
Chapter One: Exposure. 
 
In this chapter and the next, I will show that the events of Muldergate were widely covered by the 
newspapers I examined. Chapter one shows the coverage of the events leading up to Muldergate, 
and chapter two shows the events during and after Muldergate. Chapter one covers the existence 
of the propaganda war, the methods it incorporated, the Apartheid Government’s attempts to 
purchase newspapers, and their subsequent establishment of the Citizen. It also mentions the 
other misappropriations of taxes committed by the Department of Information. Chapter two 
shows the Apartheid Government’s attempts to cover up Muldergate, especially the dismissal of 
Judge Mostert. It also tells of the loss of power of the leading officials involved and of P.W. Botha’s 
reforms  in the early 1980s .   
 
Examining Apartheid’s portrayal in the 1960s provides an understanding of how the news of 
Muldergate would later be received in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the years before 
Muldergate, Westerners already disliked Apartheid, evidenced by the protests and boycotts of 
South African products. A Times article on 7 January 1960 shows an official boycott on South 
African goods organised by Liverpool’s City Council.28 A follow-up article detailing the impact of 
this  boycott was later published in the Times on 12 January 1960.29 Boycotting South African 
goods was a way for those who disagreed with Apartheid to attempt to influence government 
opinion. There were numerous other articles written about boycotting South African imports. 
                                                                 
28 Our Correspondent, "Apartheid Boycott by Council," Times, January 7, 1960, 6. For the sake of clarity, all newspaper 
references will  be cited in full  as many have similar titles and were written by the same journalist. 
29 Our Special Correspondent, "City's Boycott Starts Storm," Times, January 12, 1960, 8. 
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These were written in the Times on 14, 20, and 28 January 1960, as  well as 20 and 29 February 
1960, amongst others.30 The efficiency of boycotts and sanctions was debated, and there were 
numerous letters written in to the newspapers arguing either for or against these.31 This shows 
that many people thought about how to effectively influence government opinion a way from 
supporting Apartheid ideals. Alongside articles about boycotting South African goods, there were 
articles showing contempt for Apartheid’s effect on international sport.32 There were also articles 
that were simply negative towards Apartheid and South Africa, for example the Times article on 4 
April  1960 titled, ‘South Africa’s Insane and Evil Policy.’33 Another example was the Telegraph’s 
article on 7 September 1966, titled ‘Architect of Apartheid.’ This was a particularly scathing article 
about the then Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd. He was described as a hypocrite who combined 
“such hateful actions with such absolute faith in his own virtue ,” as well as being a man with “so 
odious a public policy with so model a private life.”34 This shows that even before Muldergate, 
Apartheid and its leaders were strongly disliked.  
                                                                 
30 “Labour Party's Plans for Campaign on Africa," Times, January 14, 1960, 8; Our Labour Correspondent, "Labour 
Agreement on Form of Apartheid Boycott," Times, January 20, 1960, 7; Our Labour Correspondent, "South Africa 
Boycott Call  by T.U.C," Times, January 28, 1960, 10; "L.C.C. Conservatives 'Opposed Boycott,'" Times, February 20, 
1960, 4; "Nine Arrested After South Africa Boycott Rally," Times, February 29, 1960, 10. See also, "Interruptions at 
Boycott Meeting," Times, March 14, 1960, 8; "London Rally Votes for Continuing Boycott," Times, March 28, 1960, 
3; “Apartheid Boycott," Daily Telegraph, January 16, 1960, 15; "Goods Boycott 'A Warning,'" Daily Telegraph, 
January 18, 1960, 19; An Industrial Correspondent, "Co-Ops Advised Not to Remove South African Goods," Daily 
Telegraph, January 21, 1960, 22; An Industrial Correspondent, "Boycott Vote by Big Co-Op," Daily Telegraph, 
January 26, 1960, 11.  
31 See, Cyril  Osborne, "South African Boycott," Times, January 19, 1960, 11; A Cooper, and David Ennals, Vice-
Chairman, "Folly of the S. A. Boycott," Daily Telegraph, January 22, 1960, 12. Patrick Van Rensburg, "Boycott of 
South African Goods," Daily Telegraph, January 16, 1960, 8; "An Unwise Boycott," Daily Telegraph, January 15, 
1960, 12; Lawrence Holden, and V. Lamb, "Better Than the Boycott," Daily Telegraph, February 11, 1960, 12; John 
Dugdale, "Boycott of South African Goods," Times, January 23, 1960, 9; Nicholas Mansfreight, and Martin Ennals, 
"Boycott," Times, January 30, 1960, 9. 
32 See, "Not to Play Against South Africans," Times, April  7, 1960, 12; Our Special Correspondent, "Mixed Greeting for 
Test Team," Times, April  18, 1960, 6; Our Correspondent, "'Boycott Test Matches,'" Times, January 8, 1960, 6. 
33 "South Africa's 'Insane and Evil  Policy,'" Times, April  4, 1960, 4. See also Daily Telegraph Reporter, "Writer Stands by 
His Views on Apartheid," Daily Telegraph, July 27, 1966, 17. 
34 Peregrine Worsthorne, "Architect of Apartheid," Daily Telegraph, September 7, 1966, 14. 
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In the 1970s , the Department of Information claimed that South Africa had become 
involved in a propaganda war against the global Anti-Apartheid Movement, and the rising 
influence of Communism, both of which sought to undermine their belief in white supremacy for 
Southern Africa. They argued that Apartheid was under attack from a relentless global enemy with 
“l imitless funding.”35 In Hacten and Giffard’s observation of wartime convention, they stated that 
it was common for the “propaganda machinery” to be “built up” amidst conflict.36 The 
Department of Information assumed this responsibility, appointing Eschel Rhoodie as Minister of 
Information in 1972. This marked the beginning of the propaganda war. In a Times article on 10 
May 1978, journalist Nicholas As hford, quoting Mulder, stated, “[n]o rules applied when the 
survival of South Africa was at stake.”37 A s imilar article about South Africa’s propaganda war was 
released the previous day, 9 May 1978.38 The Department of Information believed that through 
their propaganda campaign, they could influence popular opinion to decrease sanctions against 
South Africa. This would increase trade and stimulate economic growth, decrease political 
pressure to remove Apartheid, and decrease their growing sense of isolation amongst Western 
nations.39 A Times article on 30 September 1980 showed that Rhoodie claimed the propaganda 
war would require him to act “unconventionally.” He would also require “exceptionally wide 
discretion in respect of spending money.”40 As Rhoodie believed he was in a war, and his role was 
a matter of national security, he argued that he should not have to account for the funds he spent. 
                                                                 
35 Nicholas Ashford, "Dr. Mulder Shows Little Remorse,” Times, May 10, 1978, 7.   
36 Hachten and Giffard, The Press and Apartheid, 234.  
37 Nicholas Ashford, "Dr. Mulder Shows Little Remorse,” Times, May 10, 1978, 7.  
38 Nicholas Ashford, "How the ‘Secret Fund’ Scandal has Rocked South Africa," Times, May 9, 1978, 18. 
39 For a l ist of reasons for South Africa’s fear of increased global isolation, see Nicholas Ashford,  "Why Window 
Dressing Will Not Satisfy South Africa's Militants," Times, April  20, 1976, 12.   
40 Nicholas Ashford, "South Africa Scandal May be Revived," Times, September 30, 1980, 6. 
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The Department of Defense’s account was used to fund his propaganda war as large amounts 
could be moved without raising suspicion, and they were protected from national auditing. This 
became what was commonly known as the “secret fund.” In a Sunday Telegraph article on 18 
March 1979 titled ‘South Africa Bribed Britons,’ it was noted that the Department of Information’s 
propaganda war was secretly government funded with taxpayers’ money.41 Another Times article 
on 9 May 1978 showed that Vorster not only approved of the “secret fund,” but also took full 
responsibility for it, claiming that it was of the “highest national interest.”42 Similar articles 
mentioning the Department of Information’s “secret fund” were mentioned in the Telegraph on 
19 June 1978, 17 November 1978, 6 and 11 December 1978, 31 January 1979, and 13 and 22 
March 1979.43 In a Daily Mail article on 5 June 1979, journalist Peter Younghusband wrote, “in 
1974 nearly £4 million was transferred from the Special Defense account to Switzerland.” 44 
Rhoodie also used Swiss bank accounts and front companies to avoid auditing. This shows that 
London’s newspapers widely covered the existence of the secret fund.  
 
The propaganda campaign used a variety of mediums to sell Apartheid ideologies. There were 
conventional approaches such as posting pro-South Africa advertisements in newspapers, 
magazines, television, and radio, and hiring public relations firms to lobby for South African 
                                                                 
41 "South Africa ‘Bribed Britons,’” Sunday Telegraph, March 18, 1979, 40. 
42 Nicholas Ashford, "Mr. Vorster Admits He Approved Secret Fund," Times, May 9, 1978, 9. 
43 Nicholas Ashford, "South African Police Chief Refused Visa," Times, June 19, 1978, 1; Our Staff Correspondent in 
Johannesburg, "Secret Fund ‘Spent on High Living,’” Daily Telegraph, November 17, 1978, 5; Bruce Loudon, 
"‘Muldergate’ Scandal May Cause Split in National Party," Daily Telegraph, December 6, 1978, 4; Bruce Loudon, 
"South Africa ‘Complicity in Theft and Fraud,’” Daily Telegraph, December 6, 1978, 1; Bruce Loudon, "South Africa's 
‘Secret Projects,’” Daily Telegraph, December 11, 1978, 4; Ray Kennedy, "Vorster Faces Recall in ‘Muldergate’ 
Scandal," Daily Telegraph, January 31, 1979, 4; Christopher Munnion, "Botha Considers New ‘Gag,’” Daily Telegraph, 
March 13, 1979, 4; David Adamson, "Muldergate Letter Seen on TV," Daily Telegraph, March 22, 1979, 4.  
44  Peter Younghusband, "Muldergate," Daily Mail, June 5, 1979, 4. 
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interests in Western nations.45 There were also more illicit approaches, such as paying journalists 
to write positive articles about South Africa, Apartheid, the success of the Bantustans, and their 
progress in South West Africa (Namibia). There were also more obscure measures such as funding 
‘bus iness’ trips for journalists to see ‘the real’ South Africa for themselves. They would holiday in 
whites-only luxury resorts, visit National Parks, meet with top politicians and businessmen, and 
play golf with the famous Gary Player.46 Following encounters with the prosperity and luxury 
indulged in by white South Africans, journalists were encouraged to write positive articles 
detailing their experiences, portraying South Africa as an African paradise, and Apartheid as a 
successful institution to be respected, admired, and emulated. Ray Kennedy noted this in a Times 
article on 17 April 1978 titled ‘South Africa Offered Journalists Money.’47 Similar sentiments were 
repeated in Telegraph articles on 18 and 21 March 1979.48 Top British and American politicians 
and businessmen were also provided with such ‘business’ trips. In his Daily Mail article on 26 
March 1974, titled, ‘Bribes Scandal Man: Vorster Lying,’ George Gordon wrote that the bribery 
allegations affected “half a dozen countries and a number of top politicians .”49 Likewise, after 
experiencing the best white South Africa had to offer, British and American politicians were 
encouraged to return home and argue favorably for reduced sanctions and increased trade with 
South Africa. The propaganda campaign also promoted Apartheid’s belief in separate 
development, and journalists were commissioned to write articles claiming that Apartheid was 
                                                                 
45 For more on the Department of Information’s propaganda methods, see Julian Burgess et al., The Great White Hoax: 
South Africa's International Propaganda Machine (London: Africa Bureau, 1977).  
46 Peter Younghusband, "Muldergate," Daily Mail, June 5, 1979, 4.  
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good for black South Africans. On 5 September 1977, journalist Eric Marsden wrote an article for 
the Times titled, ‘For all the Harshness of Apartheid, Life is Not All That Bad for Blacks.’50 Amongst 
obvious spelling errors and poor grammar, the article quote d statistics and information provided 
to him by Es chel Rhoodie and the Department of Information. Throughout, are statements such as 
‘according to Dr. Rhoodie,’ ‘Dr. Rhoodie said,’ or ‘according to a survey done by Eschel Rhoodie 
and South Africa’s Department of Information.’51 Although there is no evidence to state that 
Marsden was paid by Rhoodie to write such an article, one cannot help but harbor such 
suspicions.   
 
As  part of their propaganda campaign, the Department of Information sought to counter the anti-
government articles written by newspapers both overseas and in South Africa. The Times article, 
‘Whitewashing A Bolted Horse,’ released on 9 November 1978, noted, “the Government has 
confirmed that it cannot trust the news to sustain its case; it must try to control news and 
comments at home and to distort it overseas.”52 This desire to control the English-language news 
led the Apartheid Government to attempt to purchase the Washington Star as well as SAAN, who 
owned many of South Africa’s English language newspapers and were often critical of the 
Afrikaans-speaking Apartheid Government.53 The Apartheid Government’s dislike of South Africa’s 
English-language newspapers was justified, as eventually it was the Rand Daily Mail that exposed 
Muldergate. The Apartheid Government sought ownership of an English-language newspaper in 
South Africa to counter the left leaning articles being produced. Owning SAAN would have 
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provided the additional benefit of allowing the Department of Information to censor the anti-
government sentiments widespread throughout the English-language press. Once this failed, the 
Department of Information launched their own English-language newspaper, called the Citizen. 
From the beginning, the Citizen’s existence caused much controversy in South Africa, from its 
al leged ownership by fertiliser magnate Louis Luyt to its unusually high sales records, as well as 
the disconcerting fact that it was a pro-government English-language newspaper.54 The exposure 
that the Citizen was government funded, with Luyt being little more than a figurehead, was a 
pivotal aspect of Muldergate. It revealed how much time and money the Apartheid Government 
was willing to spend to deceive the nation and influence popular opinion. The amount of money 
spent on the Citizen is a contentious issue, with conservative estimates varying from £7 million to 
£17 million.55 Ironically, funds that were supposed to be spent on the Citizen were instead used by 
Luyt to support his struggling fertiliser company.56 The fact that charges were never laid against 
Luyt reinforced the public opinion that he was an instrument of the Apartheid Government. 
Articles mentioning the Citizen and the funds that were spent on it were in the Telegraph on 9, 12, 
13, 16, 17, and 18 November 1978, and numerous other times.57 Interestingly, on 10 May 1978, 
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Mulder publicly denied any ownership of the Citizen in parliament. The truth of his involvement 
was revealed only a few months later.58  
 
Along with the Citizen, Muldergate revealed numerous other misappropriations of taxpayers’ 
money committed by the Apartheid Government. Not only did the Department of Information 
wage a secret propaganda war, they also embezzled government funds for personal use. This 
shattered the virtuous image that the National Party sought to portray. The funds were 
misappropriated in numerous ways, usually through Swiss bank accounts. In his Times article on 9 
May 1978 titled ‘How the Secret Fund Scandal Has Rocked South Africa,’ Ashford outlined some of 
the ways the Department of Information used taxpayers ’ money for personal gain. These included 
a luxury holiday to the Seychelles with Louis Luyt and other members of cabinet, purchasing luxury 
flats in Cape Town, and flying more than 4,000 miles across America to evaluate the services of a 
typis t.59 This ‘business trip’ conveniently coincided with a tennis tournament; tennis was one of 
Rhoodie’s favorite sports . Along with these misappropriations, government funds were spent on 
box tickets to rugby games, which a Telegraph s taff correspondent called “the ultimate status 
symbol of white South African culture.”60 On 4 November 1978, Ashford wrote, “[t]he secret use 
of public funds for ‘patriotic purposes’ is one thing, but the blatant misuse of tax-payer’s money, 
often for personal use, is another, so too is the laundering of funds through Swiss bank accounts, 
                                                                 
"South Africa Scandal May be Revived," Times, September 30, 1980, 6; George Gordon, "Bribes Scandal Man: 
Vorster Lying," Daily Mail, March 26, 1979, 4; Peter Younghusband, "Muldergate," Daily Mail, June 5, 1979: 4; Our 
Staff Correspondent in Johannesburg, “‘Muldergate’ Official Loses Passport," Daily Telegraph, December 4, 1978, 6.  
58 Peter Younghusband, "Muldergate," Daily Mail, June 5, 1979: 4. 
59 Nicholas Ashford, "How the 'Secret Fund 'Scandal has Rocked South Africa," Times, May 9, 1978, 18. 




or the use of public money to buy a private box at a rugby ground, or to finance a third-rate 
fi lm.”61 This showed that London’s media exposed the Department of Information’s illicit use of 
taxpayers’ money. However, few journalists demonstrated shock or surprise at the revelation of 
the misuse of taxpayer’s funds. Before Muldergate, Apartheid was disliked, and this did little to 
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Chapter Two: The Aftermath. 
 
This chapter shows that the effects of Muldergate were also covered by London’s newspapers. 
Following the exposure of Muldergate, the guilty parties desperately attempted to conceal as 
much as possible. This is best demonstrated through the dismissal of Justice Anton Mostert, the 
judge who initially revealed the information of Muldergate to the South African media. On 5 June 
1979, Younghusband wrote, “Mostert, refusing a desperate appeal to keep quiet from Prime 
Minster Botha, then in office, announced publicly…that the Citizen was indeed a Government 
project, financed secretly and run by the Department of Information.”62 In the same article, 
Younghusband stated that “Mostert was sacked for his rebellious announcement.”63 Instead of 
making Muldergate disappear, this worsened the situation, as it made the Apartheid Government 
appear guilty. In a Telegraph article on 11 November 1978, journalist Bruce Loudon noted the 
public outcry in South Africa in response to this, stating, “[m]ore than 2,000 [people] crowded into 
the Johannesburg City Hall to protest against the dismissal of Judge Anton Mostert as a 
commissioner investigating illegal foreign exchange transactions.”64 On 14 November 1978, 
Loudon noted that Mostert was dismissed by P.W Botha for “going too far” in his interference 
with the Erasmus commission.65 However, the Erasmus commission did not exist at that time, and 
P.W. Botha never specified what he meant by “too far.” These unconvincing reasons did little to 
improve the situation. Despite acquiring the position as part of the cover-up, Erasmus continued 
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Mostert’s  work and thoroughly investigated the illegal activities of the Apartheid Government. In a 
Times article on 4 November 1978, Ashford wrote, “It is undoubtedly the attempted cover-up 
rather than the wheeler-dealing in tax-payer’s money, the lying, the deceit, and by-passing of 
parliament which is the most disturbing aspect of the affair, and which finally persuaded Mr. 
Justice Mostert to speak out. As the Rand Daily Mail commented this morning, it was not the 
Watergate break-in which had such devastating consequences for the United States so much as 
the cover-up by top government people right to the president.”66 Regardless of whether the 
cover-up attempts were worse than the scandal, they did little to improve the image of the 
Apartheid Government in London’s newspapers.  
 
Another effect of Muldergate publicised by London’s newspapers was the subsequent fall from 
grace for Rhoodie, Mulder, Vorster, and van den Bergh. Vorster, whose retirement was already 
looming, shamefully concluded his time as Prime Minister and took on the ceremonial role of 
State President. His retirement was shown in the Times article, ‘This year’s News in Brief,’ on 14 
November 1979, as well in the Times ‘Diary’ on 31 December 1979.67 Along with Vorster, Mulder’s 
political career was ruined. As the scandal was nicknamed after him, Mulder would forever be 
connected to it. In a Sunday Telegraph article on 12 November 1978, Loudon noted that Mulder 
“suddenly resigned” from his position as head of the Department of Information.68 Similar articles 
about Mulder’s career finishing were written in the Telegraph on 31 January 1979, and 7 April 
                                                                 
66 Nicholas Ashford, "A Whitewash in South Africa?" Times, November 4, 1978, 14.  
67 "The Year's News in Brief," Times, November 14, 1979, 2; "Diary," Times, December 31, 1979, 1. See also, Ray 
Kennedy, "Vorster Quits in Disgrace," Daily Telegraph, June 5, 1979, 1; Nicholas Ashford, "Cape and Transvaal Wings 
of the National Party Square Up in Struggle over Vorster  Succession," Times, September 22, 1978, 7.  
68 Bruce Loudon, "Mulder Quits Party Post in South Africa Row," Sunday Telegraph, November 12, 1978, 2. 
23 
 
1979.69 Likewise, Ray Kennedy’s Times article on 30 April 1979 showed the conclusion of Mulders 
political career. He stated that Mulder was “under threat of prosecution for his refusal to testify to 
the Erasmus commission of inquiry investigating the department’s activities.”70 The Department of 
Information was also dismantled.71 Along with Mulder and Vorster, Rhoodie disgracefully resigned 
and fled the country for fear of imprisonment. He was unsuccessful in avoiding the South African 
Government, and was eventually sentenced to prison. In a Daily Mail article on 9 October 1979, 
Gordon wrote that “Doctor Eschel Rhoodie began a six-year jail sentence last night,” and, “Dr. 
Rhoodie, who fled from South Africa when the scandal broke, was found guilty of five counts of 
fraud, involving more than £35,000.”72 Six months later, Rhoodie successfully appealed the ruling, 
was released, and had his possessions returned. A Times article on 15 October 1980 noted that 
Rhoodie’s estate was estimated to be worth £222,000.00.73 The minor punishment he received 
and his successful appeal showed that the Apartheid Government was not intent on punishing its 
own. This reinforced the idea that his sentence was a mere formality, and part of a greater cover-
up.  
 
Before their dismissals, Mulder and Rhoodie did not retire unobtrusively. London’s newspapers 
covered the political infighting displayed by the guilty party. After fleeing overseas, Rhoodie 
recorded tapes providing evidence of the internal corruption of the propaganda war. He used 
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these tapes as a form of insurance to blackmail the other members of the National Party. He 
threatened to release the tapes if the South African Government sought to capture him or force 
him to testify in court. He also made public the fact that if he died of a ‘mysterious accident,’ his 
lawyer would release the tapes on his behalf. In a Telegraph article on 6 March 1979, David 
Kennedy, quoting van den Bergh, stated that “the Rhoodie tapes would have caused ‘irreparable 
harm to South Africa’, and implicated top political figures.”74 It is impossible to know exactly how 
much of this was true and how much was a desperate act of deception by a frantic van den Bergh 
seeking to unite with Rhoodie and implicate the other members of the National Party.75 Rhoodie 
attempted to use these tapes to blackmail P.W. Botha into returning his passport, and the 
possessions the Apartheid Government had seized from him, as well as provide him with pardon 
and a public apology.76 In a Telegraph article on 21 March 1979, David Adamson showed that 
Rhoodie claimed to have “documentation containing summaries of secret projects in the last five 
years ,” and that some included the signature of Vorster.77 Similar articles were written in the 
Telegraph on 13 and 22 March 1979.78 Rhoodie also sought to implicate Mulder in his schemes. 
Chris topher Munnion’s Telegraph article on 23 March 1979, titled, ‘Rhoodie Threat to Vorster: ‘To 
Bring down Temple’’ showed how Rhoodie threatened to implicate the other key members of the 
National Party if they tried to arrest him.79 It described the infighting displayed by these key 
members of Muldergate. Along with this, many of those implicated in Muldergate claimed they 
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were being used as “scapegoats.” Van den Bergh and Rhoodie were the most vocal in this regard. 
This was shown in Telegraph articles on 8 and 10 December 1978, amongst others.80 This political 
infighting was thoroughly documented by London’s newspapers  and did little to improve the 
Apartheid Government’s international image.  
 
Along with the political infighting following Muldergate, there were also numerous calls for P.W. 
Botha to resign from his new role as Prime Minister. These were mostly from opposition political 
parties. This was covered by the Telegraph in articles on 11 November 1978, 7 and 8 December 
1978 as  well as 13 March 1979.81 P.W. Botha rejected these claims, arguing that he was not 
involved with Muldergate or the propaganda war.82 In the end, the calls for him to resign were 
outvoted 130 to 30.83 Along with stating his own non-involvement, P.W. Botha claimed that if any 
members of his new cabinet were implicated in Muldergate, he would resign.84 After surviving the 
calls for his resignation, P.W. Botha initiated a series of Apartheid reforms. He reshaped the 
political cabinet, usually replacing verkrampte with verligte members. An example of this was 
covered by the Times article ‘Pretoria’s Top Security Job Goes to Young Don,” released on 15 
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November 1979.85 P.W. Botha ’s reforms removed some aspects of petty Apartheid.86 In his article 
‘Coups , Wars and Some Hope,’ Roy Lewis noted that “[P.W] Botha hastened liberal measures such 
as  legalising African trade unions in a desperate attempt to regain control over the pace of 
events.”87 This shows that the media covered not only P.W. Botha ’s reforms, but also the motives 
behind them. Another example of this was in the Times article on 29 January 1981, which stated, 
“[f]or the rest, Mr. Botha has made great play with the modification of Apartheid in practice. The 
reality is less impressive than the propaganda. It irritates the party verkrampte’s, but they know 
that behind this screen, Mr. Botha has increased state control over political expression by 
everybody else. The black press has been silenced, and the freedom of the white, mainly English-
language, press is being progressively circumscribed.”88 Overall, London’s media documented the 
different aspects of P.W. Botha’s reforms.   
 
In the past two chapters I have shown that the events of Muldergate were covered by the three 
newspapers I examined, making the information of Muldergate widely available to the  British 
public. Chapter three provides reasons to explain how Muldergate could have been “just a bump 
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Chapter Three: The Why.  
 
This chapter shows that despite the lack of evidence provided by Nixon when he claimed that 
Muldergate was “just a bump in the road,” his assertion was, in fact, correct. It provides an 
interpretation of global events that allude to, and reinforce, the validity of Nixon’s claim. As 
Apartheid was a system of racial discrimination that placed whites at the top, and everyone else 
beneath, the term “rolling on” will be used to describe the maintenance of Apartheid’s race-based 
policies by the South African Government. This needs to be considered in the light of P.W. Botha’s 
reforms. Were these reforms superficial, or did they fundamentally change the nature and 
s tructure of Apartheid? This section will show that P.W. Botha’s reforms were primarily about 
power consolidation, not the dissolution of Apartheid. They also provided the additional benefit of 
enabling the West to claim that Apartheid was slowly fading away, thus justifying their inaction 
amidst cries for sanctions. There were also other global factors that enabled Muldergate to be 
“just a bump in the road.” The rise of sensationalist media in the 1970s and 1980s  affected how 
Muldergate was received. As  Muldergate was a slowly unravelling political scandal that took over 
a year for the information to become fully available, it did not conform to the criteria of a popular 
scandal established by the tabloids. This resulted in a  general lack of interest in Muldergate. The 
time delay also negated the impact of the scandal as there was no “moment” of revelation.  As 
Apartheid was already disliked, and the government was assumed to be corrupt, when the news 
of Muldergate was revealed, it did little to damage Apartheid’s already negative reputation. To 
many, this was simply a confirmation of things that they already believed. The overwhelming fear 
of Communism was also used as a shield by the Apartheid Government. They argued that 
Apartheid was a “bulwark against Communism,” and that if they lost power to the ANC, South 
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Africa would become a communist nation. The West also displayed a general lack of interest in 
developing nations, except when i t came to sports and business. A data analysis of articles that 
appeared in the Times revealed that the most popular topics for news articles about South Africa 
and Apartheid, both before and after Muldergate, were sports , business and finance. These topics 
had more newspaper articles written about them than politics and social justice issues. This 
displayed, as well as reinforced, the West’s overall lack of interest in Muldergate.   
 
Following Muldergate, P.W. Botha’s reforms consolidated his power and reasserted white 
dominance. Although these reforms incorporated the rhetoric of progress and change, they had 
l ittle effect on the day-to-day lives of black South Africans. In Breaking Story: The South African 
Press, Gordon Jackson noted, “[m]ost blacks viewed the new dispensation with disdain, regarding 
it as  simply a new way of packaging white control.”89 Jackson argued that P.W. Botha’s reforms 
were a continuation of Apartheid ideals. To many black South Africans, it made little difference 
that a verligte was running the country instead of a verkrampte, both were seen equally 
disdainfully. In ‘Government-Initiated Reform in South Africa and Its Implications for U.S. Foreign 
Policy,’ Kevin Danaher said, “[t]he white government had no intention whatsoever of altering the 
fundamental aspects of Apartheid.” 90 In ‘Culture as Communication: The Rise of the Left-Wing 
Press in South Africa,’ Don Pinnock noted that P.W. Botha’s reforms were “to eliminate those 
racially discriminatory clauses in the existing Apartheid legislation that attached opprobrium 
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abroad but made little or no difference with respect to ensuring white privilege.”91 Although some 
minor changes to petty Apartheid were made, overall, there was little change for the majority of 
black South Africans. The National Party intended to maintain Apartheid as much as possible. 
Danaher stated that P.W. Botha’s reforms were to “gain better control over the African workforce, 
in order to cultivate more skilled workers while keeping the majority locked up in rural labor 
reserves (‘bantustans’).”92 This demonstrated a continuation of Apartheid principles, as the white 
minority continued to oppress the black majority. It was also a consolidation of white power. 
Another reform that presented itself as egalitarian, but in effect was the opposite, was P.W 
Botha’s creation of a tricameral legislature. Despite P.W. Botha’s claims that a tricameral 
parliament empowered each race with agency over their own affairs, all power was still firmly 
within the grasp of the white minority.93 In Politics in South Africa: From Vorster to De Klerk, Keith 
Maguire showed how this applied, stating, “[P.W] Botha’s first years as Prime Minster and then as 
State President were marked by a shift in power away from the legislature and towards the 
executive.”94 By retaining power within the executive, P.W Botha created a powerless parliament. 
Danaher claimed that P.W. Botha ’s reforms created a “dictatorship in all but name.”95 P.W. 
Botha’s language was indicative of his emphasis on the power of the executive, firmly enforced by 
the military. He used the phrase ‘Total Onslaught’ to describe the position South Africa was in, 
claiming the country was being attacked by an overwhelming enemy and that the only adequate 
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response was his ‘Total Strategy.’ In The Language of Domination, 1978-1983, Deborah Posel 
argued that ‘Total Strategy’ enabled the government to claim, “a legitimate vested interest in the 
regulation of the market according to the said ‘realities’ and ‘problems’ of the moment.” 96 By 
creating an enemy, the government could justify their interference with and attempts to control 
different aspects of society. P.W. Botha’s reforms allowed the West to ignore anti-Apartheid cries, 
as  they waited for the slow destruction of Apartheid. They did not have to experience any 
discomfort by executing their threats to place sanctions on South African goods and servi ces. 
Despite dismantling some cosmetic features of petty Apartheid, overall, P.W. Botha’s reforms 
firmly consolidated power in the hands of the white minority.  
 
Another factor that contributed towards confirming Nixon’s “bump in the road” claim was that 
many Westerners already thought that the Apartheid Government was corrupt, and little could be 
done to worsen Apartheid’s reputation. O’Meara noted that issues of corruption were hardly new 
in Apartheid South Africa.97 He stated, “[f]or four out of five South Africans, Muldergate was no 
aberration but rather the norm in, and future confirmation of, a thoroughly corrupt society.”98 
This view extended into the rest of the world too. In ‘Beyond the Information Scandal: When 
South Africa Bought into Global News ,’ Chris Paterson and Vanessa Malila argued that the 
Apartheid Government was unable to improve its image through their vast propaganda 
campaigns, and Muldergate did little to change global perspectives. They stated, “[w]estern 
perceptions of South Africa continued to worsen, in the longer term there is little to indicate that 
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the propaganda efforts  organised by Eschel Rhoodie significantly altered the stigma of the 
Apartheid policy of governance.”99 There was already a stigma attached to Apartheid before the 
propaganda war. In ‘Political Corruption: Before and After Apartheid,’ Jonathon Hyslop traced the 
story of political corruption throughout different phases in South Africa’s history. He noted that 
before the 1970s, in the period from 1948-1972, the government was corrupt and generally 
sought to benefit the white Afrikaans speaking South Africans. He discussed how their polices 
were established to benefit Afrikaners, and how they created a large white middle class that 
enjoyed unprecedented levels of prosperity.100 He described the corruption in the 1970s as a 
“scramble for personal enrichment” that was “reflected at the highest levels.”101  He noted that 
through Muldergate, the world was given a glimpse into this corruption.102 Many people thought 
the Apartheid Government was corrupt before Muldergate, so the events of Muldergate did little 
to worsen their already negative reputation. 
 
The rise of sensationalist journalism affected how the news of Muldergate was received. Williams 
examined the emergence of “tabloidisation,” “sensationalist journalism,” and the “cult of 
personality” in the 1970s .103 He stated, “[m]ost of Fleet Street’s best-selling newspapers went 
tabloid, incorporating changes in the size, values, and production methods.”104 Williams claimed 
that the Sun created a “formula” for tabloidisation that many other newspapers copied, effectively 
                                                                 
99 Chris Paterson and Vanessa Malila, "Beyond the Information Scandal: When South Africa Bought into Global News," 
Ecquid Novi 34 (2013): 11, accessed July 2, 2017. doi:10.1080/02560054.2013.772531. 
100 Jonathan Hyslop, "Political Corruption: Before and After Apartheid," Journal of Southern African Studies 31 (2005): 
781, accessed June 27, 2017. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz. 
101 Hyslop, “Political Corruption,” 782.  
102 Hyslop, “Political Corruption,” 782. 
103 Will iams, Read All About It, 197-198. 
104 Will iams, Read All About It, 197-198. 
32 
 
“set[ting] the agenda for Fleet Street as a whole.”105 This formula incorporated “pushing the 
newspaper content relentlessly downmarket” and has been blamed for contributing towards the 
overall “dumbing down” of the mass media.106 Tunstall said, “[t]he most popular items tend to be 
things which are not really part of journalism as traditionally understood – the television guide, 
the s trip cartoons, and the stars (of both horoscope and entertainment).”107 Tunstall claimed that 
this  led to a change in newspapers’ content, as articles requiring investigative journalism were 
replaced with trite entertainment pieces.108 In chapter 10 of Pulling Newspapers Apart: Analysing 
Print Journalism, Ros  Coward provided an example of the difference between tabloids and quality 
papers, showing the effect of sensationalised journalism. He stated, “the Times and Daily 
Telegraph s ti ll carried the antiquated court circular informing about royal engagements, while the 
Sun and Mirror jostled for the latest shot of Prince Harry falling drunkenly out of a nightclub.”109 
Although this was in 2007 and not 1978, it exemplifies the sensationalist journalism characteristic 
within tabloids. The increasing popularity of tabloids contributed towards the overall disinterest in 
Muldergate; Williams noted a correlation between the increasing popularity of tabloids and a 
decreasing interest in global politics.110 The effects of Muldergate were less likely to receive a 
s trong reaction from the general British population, because they had been conditioned to receive 
news in a sensationalised format. Although Muldergate was a scandal, it was political, not sexual, 
and did not involve celebrities. Hyslop ta lks about the “usefulness” of the “moment” of a scandal, 
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which did not happen for Muldergate because information was slowly released over a period of 
around a year.111 The lack of a moment of scandal is a useful indicator of Muldergate's 
underwhelming effect on Apartheid’s international image.   
 
Another reason that Muldergate was “just a bump in the road,” was that Britain was more 
concerned about South African sports than any other aspect of South Africa, especially politics. In 
the table below, I examined the first 100 articles in a key-word search and counted how many 
articles were related to sports, politics, business and finance, and children suffering. This showed 
what topics the media prioritised. The majority of articles about both South Africa and Ap artheid 
in both time periods were about sports , followed by businesss articles. There are almost no 
articles on children suffering, either through diseases, poverty, famine, or malnourishment. This is 
indicative of newspapers’ priorities, showing that social issues were the least important. The only 
exception to the trend are the 32 articles relating to politics between 1980 and 1985. This number 
is  inflated because there were many articles written about the newly independent Zimbabwe, 
Robert Mugabe’s opinions of Apartheid, and whether or not he would impose sanctions on South 
Africa. Overall, sports, business and finances were more important than politics and social justice 
issues. This was shown in a Times article on 8 January 1980, titled, ‘Sport on the Altar of 
Politics.’112 The article complained that politics was interfering with sports. At least to that author 
alone, sports were more important than politics. Another example of how South Africa was best 
associated with sports was shown by a  Times article on 4 January 1980 titled, ‘The Soviet Invasion 
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of Afganistan.’113 Alhtough this article was not about South Africa at all, it briefly mentioned South 
Africa as an example of how politics was interfering with sports. A Times article on 10 January 
1980, titled ‘Playing the Political Game,’ had nothing to do with South African politics at all, 
instead it was about how Apartheid’s racial policies were affecting sports.114 Articles such as this 
s trongly suggest that the readers of the newspapers I examined were more concerned with sports 
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 1970 to 1977 1980 to 1985 
 “South Africa” “Apartheid” “South Africa” “Apartheid” 
Sport. 30 56 30 34 
Bus iness and Finances. (Includes: 
Mining and Exchange Rates) 
35 1 28 4 
Politics. 4 9 10 32 
Children suffering. (Includes: 
Poverty, Hunger, Disease, and 
Refugees) 
1 0 1 0 
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The Apartheid Government sold their racist policy to the West by packaging it as anti-
communist. To many Westerners, Apartheid was the lesser evil of the two. One of P.W. Botha’s 
‘Total Strategy’ claims was that it was a necessary response to the ‘Total Onslaught’ of 
Communism.115 In Politics and Society in South Africa, Daryl Glaser noted how the Apartheid 
Government sought to label the ANC as a communist organisation, thus discrediting it in the eyes 
of the West.116 In The Anti-Apartheid Reader: The Struggle Against White Racist Rule in South 
Africa, David Mermelstein showed this method when he stated, “[n]ot only does the African 
National Congress, the symbol of black resistance, have Communists in its inner circle, it is 
indebted to the Soviet Union for its military aid.”117 This was used by the Apartheid Government 
to gain favor in the eyes of the West. In South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation, James 
Hentz noted that Malan sought to “ally with the Western powers by offering South Africa as a 
bulwark against the spread of Communism and as an outpost of white domination.”118 In ‘South 
Africa's Propaganda War: A Bibliographic Essay,’ Galen Hull stated, “[i]n March 1965, three full-
page advertisements appeared in the New York Times and Washington Post. The first, on 21 
March, emphasised South Africa’s role as a rich, anti-communist ally that had attracted one 
hundred thousand immigrants in the last three years.”119 These quotes show how the Apartheid 
Government sold themselves to the West as anti-communist. Likewise, Mermelstein noted the 
                                                                 
115 Roger Beck, History of South Africa (Westport: Greenwood, 2000), 163, accessed June 28, 2017. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com. 
116 Daryl Glaser, Politics and Society in South Africa (London: SAGE, 2000), 212, accessed June 28, 2017. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.  
117 David Mermelstein, ed., The Anti-Apartheid Reader: The Struggle Against White Racist Rule in South Africa  (New 
York: Grove, 1987), 9. 
118 James Hentz, South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2005), 23, 
accessed September 19, 2017. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com. 
119  Galen Hull, "South Africa's Propaganda War: A Bibliographic Essay," African Studies Review 22, (1979): 82, accessed 
July 2, 2017. doi:10.2307/523897.  
36 
 
Apartheid Government’s claim, “[i]f the white regime falls, communist rule becomes an immediate 
possibility.”120 The Apartheid Government used the threat of communist expansion to consolidate 
white power and maintain their policy of racial superiority. In his review of Selling Apartheid, 
Chris tian Makgala recalls how Nixon identified a link between the fall of Communism and the end 
of Apartheid. 121 Nixon claimed that these were correlated, and said that once Communism fell, 
the South African Government had lost one of its main selling points for Apartheid. Likewise, in 
South Africa in World History, Iris  Berger noted, “[w]ith the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South 
African Government lost its rhetorical rationale for opposing reforms – namely that it was holding 
the l ine against Communism.”122 This shows that many Westerners who did like Apartheid saw it 
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Part Three: Conclusion.  
 
 
In this dissertation, I have examined Nixon’s claim that Muldergate was “just a  bump in the road,” 
having a negligible impact on South Africa’s international image. I have examined how South 
Africa was portrayed by London’s media, revealing how the information of Muldergate was made 
widely available to the British public, and uncovered how it affected the public opinion of 
Apartheid. To negate any claims to ignorance, I needed to confirm that Muldergate’s events were 
widely available to the public. I did this by examining newspapers. I have shown that the events of 
Muldergate were available in just three newspapers, all of which possess conservative 
reputations. This showed that it is even more likely that the information of the Muldergate 
scandal was widely available across all of London’s newspapers. The first two chapters were 
devoted to showing that all the events of the Muldergate scandal were made public through these 
three newspapers. The lack of public outrage at the scandal confirmed the poor reputation that 
Apartheid already had. The newspapers revealed the existence of the Department of 
Information’s propaganda war, its funding, and the methods employed. They showed the 
attempts to purchase SAAN and the Washington Star, and following these failures, the 
establishment of the Citizen. They showed the Apartheid Government’s attempts to hide the 
events, especially the dismissal of Justice Mostert for revealing the scandal to the South African 
media. They showed the numerous misuses of taxpayer money, the bribing of politicians and 
journalists, the fall of Rhoodie, Mulder, Vorster, and van den Bergh, as well as their subsequent in-
fighting. The newspapers showed the Apartheid Government’s internal corruption, the scramble 
for personal enrichment, P.W. Botha’s ascension to Prime Minster, and his subsequent power-
consolidating reforms that were used to reaffirm and sustain Apartheid. Despite all the 
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information about Muldergate being widely available, both Muldergate and South African politics 
were s till relatively unimportant to Britain. In chapter three I suggested some reasons why this 
was so.   
 
I examined global trends that affected how Muldergate was received, reducing its impact on the 
Western world. The growing influence of tabloids and sensationalist newspapers, exemplified by 
the Sun, trained their readership to consume a type of news that Muldergate did not conform to. 
The scandal was political, occurred in a foreign nation, and was not sexualised. The information 
was slowly released, meaning that there was no big “moment” of scandal. Along with this, 
Apartheid already had a negative global image, and the existence of corruption within the 
Apartheid Government was little surprise to many South Africans and Westerners alike. P.W. 
Botha’s reforms only altered petty Apartheid enough to exude the image of a slowly-dismantling 
system. This enabled the West to justify their non-involvement, as they could claim that Apartheid 
was resolving itself. The data analysis showed that the West was more concerned with sports than 
politics. Most of the mentions of the protests about Apartheid were in articles about sports. The 
West also saw Apartheid as the lesser evil when faced with Communism as the alternative. They 
would rather have had racist South Africa than communist South Africa. All these factors enabled 
Muldergate to be “just a bump in the road.” P.W. Botha ’s reforms kept Apartheid going. He 
consolidated white power in the executive, and despite his rhetoric of change, his reforms had 
l ittle effect on the day-to-day lives of black South Africans. Following Muldergate and into the 
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